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INTRODUCTION
In December 2002, Chile and the United States, after more than a
decade of negotiation, reached an agreement on the terms of a Free
Trade Agreement ("FTA").' The Chile-U.S. FTA is expected to
become operational at the end of 2003 or the beginning of 2004.2
* LLM candidate, 2003, American University, Washington College of Law; JD
equivalent, Moscow State Law Academy, Russia, 1999. I would like to thank my
fellow-students Marcelo Cerna, Eduardo Correa, Marco Opazo, Cristobal Reyes,
my friends Pedro Taborga, Jimmy Castillo, and my husband Michael for providing
comments and assistance with this paper.
1. See A Really Big Free Trade Zone, Bus. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 40
(announcing the conclusion of a United States free-trade deal with Chile as part of
a broader strategy of the current U.S. administration to build a thirty-four-nation
Free Trade Area of the Americas); Chile y EE. UU Concluyeron con Exito
Negociaciones Para TLC [Chile and the United States Sucessfully Concluded FTA
Negotiations], ESTRATEGIA, Dec. 12, 2002 (reporting the successful conclusion of
Chile-U.S. free trade negotiations and outlining major terms of the agreement),
available at http://www.estrategia.cl/histo/200212/12/economi/ducos.htm (last
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Chile has adopted an international economic policy of trade
liberalization to compensate its economy for certain natural
disadvantages, such as its small internal market and the country's
geographical distance from its largest trade partners.3 Chile has
entered into a number of FTAs with other regions and countries,
including Mexico, Canada, Central American countries, the
European Union, and South Korea.' The Chilean government hopes
that recent agreements with the European Union and agreements to
be signed with the United States and South Korea will reverse
Chile's economic slowdown by increasing the country's export
revenues, expanding the infrastructure of export industries, boosting
foreign direct investment by up to $1.3 billion a year, and adding at
least one percentage point to the growth of the gross domestic
product ("GDP").5 The feasibility of these expectations depends on
the Chilean government's willingness to adopt further market-
visited Jan. 17, 2003); Clinton Porteous Santiago, Chile in Free-Trade Deal With
U.S., AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Dec. 13, 2002, at 24 (explaining the importance and
mutual benefit for the region of the Free Trade Agreement between Chile and the
United States, and discussing some of its terms).
2. See Acuerdos Comerciales, lo Ms Relevante de 2002 [Trade Agreements:
the Most Important of 2002], ESTRATEGIA, Dec. 23, 2002 (describing free-trade
agreements that Chile negotiated or signed in 2002), available at
http://www.estrategia.cl/histo/200212/23/economi/tlceu.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2003); Tratado de Libre Comercio Chile-Estados Unidos De qud se trata?
[Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement: What is it About?], GOBIERNO DE
CHILE (Jan. 16, 2002) (explaining the importance for Chile of a free-trade
agreement with the United States, listing major terms of its draft, and evaluating its
impact on Chile's economy), available at
http://www.direcon.cl/frame/acuerdos-internacionales/documentos/Doc.%20Ch2.p
df (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
3. See Going it Alone - Chile's Trade Agreements, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2003,
at 41 (describing Chile's policy on trade liberalization and its expectations from
free trade agreements with the United States, the European Union, and South
Korea).
4. See Department of International Economic Relations of Chile's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Acuerdos Econ6micos Internacionales [International Economic
Treaties] (listing Chile's bilateral and multilateral international economic treaties
and providing their texts or summaries), at
http://www.direcon.cl/frame/acuerdos-internacionales/f regionales.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003).
5. See Going it Alone - Chile's Trade Agreements, supra note 3 (commenting
on the economic growth Chile expects to experience from free trade agreements
with the United States, European Union, and South Korea).
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oriented reforms aimed at modernizing Chile's business regulations.6
This comment focuses on a single area of Chile's business law that
affects foreign direct and portfolio investment in the country: capital,
or currency, control measures that restrict withdrawal by foreign
investors of their capital funds from Chile.
I. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE AND LEGAL
RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER OF CAPITAL
Long before the terms of the Chile-U.S. FTA were agreed to, and
despite its small market size, many observers regarded Chile as the
most attractive emerging market in South America for foreign
investment - combining the benefits of economic stability, political
transparency, and relative ease of doing business.7
6. See Sebastian Edwards, Americas: How Chile Can Make the Most of its
U.S. Trade Deal, WALL STREET J., Jan. 3, 2003, at All (suggesting that Chile's
high expectations of benefits from the Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement may not
be realistic without a serious effort at reforming economic legislation).
7. See Joseph Contreras, Open For Business; While the Rest of South America
Suffers, Chile is Politically Stable, Relatively Prosperous and Enjoying 'The Best
Years in its History', NEWSWEEK INT'L, Aug. 12, 2002, at 24 (describing current
Chilean political stability and economic prosperity compared to other South
American countries). The Economist Intelligence Unit has named Chile Latin
America's number one country for foreign investment, above Mexico and Brazil.
Id. When Berlin's Transparency International Organization surveyed ninety-one
countries, it rated Chile among the top twenty nations with the least corruption. Id.
As the former U.S. Ambassador to Chile, John O'Leary noted, "[i]n my day-to-day
experience, what I was hearing was that people quickly understood the ease of
doing business .... The lack of corruption ... makes businesses feel comfortable"
in Chile. Jonathan Franklin, Chile Bucks Region's Economic Trend: Stability
Keeps Foreign Capital on the Increase, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2002, at A15
(emphasizing that strict fiscal discipline adopted by Pinochet's government and
maintained by successive democratic governments resulted in public sector
surpluses and saved Chile from the foreign debt trap suffered by the country's
larger and more richly endowed neighbors); see also Rodrigo Cifuentes et al.,
Capital Markets in Chile: From Financial Repression to Financial Deepening, 4
ECON. POLICY PAPERS OF THE CENT. BANK OF CHILE (Aug. 2002) (discussing the
evolution of capital markets in Chile), at
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/studiesandpublications/publications/policies/pdf/dpe04.
pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). Chile's economic stability and sustainable
progress stem from structural economic reforms of the 1970s, reform of the
banking system and capital markets during the 1980s, and pioneering privatization
of its pension system. Id. at 5; see also Sean Higgins, Social Security Privatization
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Apart from buying American depositary receipts ("ADR") issued
by Chilean companies on U.S. capital markets, there are two legal
frameworks for foreign investment in Chile:8 Decree-Law No. 600 of
the 1974 Foreign Investment Statute ("DL 600") 9 and Chapter XIV
of the Compendium of Regulations of Foreign Exchange ("Chapter
XIV"), 1° issued by Chile's Central Bank pursuant to the Organic
Constitutional Law On Central Bank ("Central Bank Law").1" Most
foreign investment comes to Chile via DL 600.12 For many years the
- Is Chile The Best Model?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 15, 2002, at A16
(discussing reasons that moved Chile to reform its state-run pay-as-you-go pension
system into a private pension fund industry with individual accounts for every
worker, and the resulting benefits for workers and the country's economy).
8. See Policies and Regulations, GOBIERNO DE CHILE (containing an overview




9. See Foreign Investment Statute, Decree-Law No. 600 (1974) (Chile), D.O.,
Dec. 16, 1993 [hereinafter Decree-Law No. 600] (providing an English translation
of the statute), available at http://www.cochilco.cl/content/b-
legislation/dl600-eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
10. See Compendio de Normas de Cambio Intemacionales, Capitulo XIV:
Normas Aplicables a los Cr~ditos, Dep6sitos, Inversiones y Aportes de Capital
Provenientes del Exterior [Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations,
Chapter XIV: Regulations Applicable to Loans, Deposits, Investment and Capital
Contribution. of Funds of Foreign Origin] (Chile) at
http://www.bcentral.cl/Normas/cnci/CapXIV.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Chapter XIV]; see also Acuerdo del Consejo del Banco Central de
Chile [Resolution of the Council of the Central Bank of Chile] No. 961-04-020117
(Chile), Jan. 23, 2002, (approving Chapter XIV), at
http://www.bcentral.cl/Normas/circulares/cnci/circ768.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2003). The Council of the Central Bank has issued a Compendium of Regulations
of Foreign Exchange pursuant to its authority to establish the terms and means in
which foreign and domestic investors and creditors may use their capital
investments in Chile and proceeds thereof, including their repatriation and
reinvestment in Chile. See Ley Orgdinica Constitucional del Banco Central
[Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank] No. 18.840, art. 47 (Chile), D.O.,
Oct. 10, 1989, available at
http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/funcionesyorganizacion/leyorganica/ley08.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2003).
11. See Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10.
12. See Foreign Investment by Inflow Mechanism: 1974-2002, Jan.-Sept.
(containing statistical data on volumes of foreign investment gathered by Chile's
Committee on Foreign Investment), at http://www.cinver.cl/fdi-inchile/fistats.asp
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United States has been the largest single source for DL 600
investments. 3
Enacted in 1974, DL 600 remains a liberal regulation of foreign
investment in most respects. There are no restrictions on the share of
foreign participation in Chilean companies - up to one hundred
percent of a company's capital may be foreign-owned. 14
Additionally, there is no limit on the maximum length of time that a
foreign investment may remain in Chile.15
DL 600 provides for a contractual relationship between Chile and
the foreign investor, created by an agreement between Chile's
Committee on Foreign Investment, an inter-agency governmental
body, acting on behalf of the Republic of Chile, and the foreign
entity or individual.' 6 DL 600 guarantees a foreign investor the
following rights: free repatriation of profits and proceeds from
liquidation of reinvested profits at any time;17 a choice between
Chile's ordinary tax regime and the special tax regime; 8 a right to
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003). In 2001, Chile received $4,733,000 in foreign
investment under Decree-Law No. 600 and only $775,000 under Chapter XIV. Id.
For the period of January-September of 2002, the ratio is almost the same:
$1,249,000 under Decree-Law No. 600 and $279,000 under Chapter XIV. Id.
13. See Foreign Direct Investment (D.L.600); FDI Authorized and Materialized
by Country of Origin: 1974-2002, at http:// www.cinver.cl/fdiinchile/fistats.asp
(last visited Jan. 26, 2003) (containing statistical data on volumes of foreign
investment gathered by Chile's Committee on Foreign Investment). For the period
of January 1974 - September 2002, U.S. business entities and individuals invested
about $15,785,000 in Chile, which amounts to 31.7 percent of total foreign
investment for the same period of time. Id.
14. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9 (indicating the liberalness of this
statute in regulating foreign investment); Policies and Regulations, supra note 8
(providing a general overview of Chile's foreign investment law by Chile's
Committee on Foreign Investment).
15. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9 (emphasizing further Chile's
attractiveness to foreign investors).
16. See id. art. 3 (providing for a period of time after execution of the
investment contract in which an investor may bring in capital -- not more than
eight years for mining projects and not more than three years for investment in
other sectors).
17. See id. art. 4 (outlining the rights of a foreign investor).
18. See id. art. 7 (providing for an effective, fixed income tax rate of forty-two
percent for a ten-year period from commencement of investment project
operations). Currently the tax rate of forty-two percent is higher than the income
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indemnification for any property loss in case of expropriation, and a
right to challenge such expropriation in Chilean courts.' 9 DL 600 also
imposes the following obligations on foreign investors: not to
withdraw and repatriate originally imported and invested capital for
one year from the date such capital was brought into Chile;20 not to
transfer ownership, use or possession of technology, which is a part
of a foreign investment from its original entity, and not to amortize
or depreciate such technology;2' and to conduct all currency
exchange operations for purposes of investment or repatriation of
funds through a local banking institution licensed in the Formal
Exchange Market.22
tax rate of the common tax regime, which makes it unreasonable for foreign
investors to avail of the special tax regime. Id. Under the common tax regime,
foreign investors would pay fifteen percent of taxable income on earnings they
reinvest in Chile. See Decreto-Ley Sobre Impuesto a la Renta [Decree-Law on
Income Tax] No. 824, art. 20 (Chile), D.O., Dec. 31, 1974, available at
http://www.sii.cl/pagina/jurisprudencia/legislacion/basica/d1824.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2003). For repatriated profits, the income tax rate is thirty-five percent.
Id. art. 58. Besides income tax, companies, including those with foreign
investment, are subject to the value added tax ("VAT") in Chile, which applies to
all sales of goods, provision of services, imports, in-kind contributions into
companies, and sales and lease of corporate assets. See Decreto-Ley Sobre
Impuesto a las Ventas y Servicios [Decree-Law on Tax on Sales and Services] No.
1.606, art. 8 (Chile), D.O., Dec. 3, 1976, available at
http://www.sii.cl/pagina/jurisprudencia/legislacion/basica/dl825.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2003). VAT rates vary according to the type of taxable operation. Id. The
general rate applicable to the majority of operations is eighteen percent. Id. art. 14.
Exporters recover their VAT paid in the process of production of exported goods
and services. Id. art. 36.
19. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9, art. 10 (providing for quick
administrative resolution of investors' complaints). Investors may file their
complaints on allegedly discriminatory regulations to the Foreign Investment
Committee, an inter-agency body charged with negotiation and execution of
foreign investment contracts on behalf of Chile. Id. The Foreign Investment
Committee must rule on complaints within sixty days and, having found
discrimination against a foreign investor, must take affirmative steps to remove it
or require proper authorities to do so. Id. Regardless of whether or not a foreign
investor applies to the Foreign Investment Committee, it may also seek redress in a
court of law. Id.
20. See id. art. 4 (imposing restrictions on foreign investors).
21. See id. art. 2(c) (limiting actions by foreign investors concerning
technology).
22. See id. art. 4 (stating that such exchange operations must be made at the
most favorable rate). The Formal Exchange Market consists of Chile's banking
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An investor, however, is not required to use the framework offered
by DL 600, i.e., a foreign entity or individual may bring in funds for
any investment purpose, without entering into contracts with Chile's
government. In that case, a foreign investor will be subject to Chile's
law without any exceptions otherwise negotiable in a DL 600
agreement.23 Foreign capital may be brought into Chile without any
prior agreements or authorizations, and the above-mentioned Chapter
XIV addresses procedural issues of currency exchange upon
importation of funds and repatriation of profits.24 It provides that all
loans, deposits, investments, and equity contributions25  over
$10,00026 from outside Chile must be converted into the national
currency on the Formal Exchange Market with notification of Chile's
Central Bank. 27 Repatriation of funds is also done through the Formal
Exchange Market, and the Central Bank must be notified of the
transaction.28
The Central Bank also permits another currency control
mechanism that authorizes the Central Bank to issue temporary
regulations ordering deposit of a reserve of up to forty percent of
funds intended to be transferred out of Chile and deposited, loaned or
invested in a foreign country.29 It also permits a reserve of up to forty
percent of funds coming from abroad and intended to be invested,
institutions and other entities authorized to conduct operations on that market. See
Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10, art. 41.
23. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9, art. 1 lbis(2) (allowing foreign
investors who bring in more than $50,000,000 to negotiate certain favorable tax
and accounting treatment, such as accelerated depreciation of certain kinds or
property, and extended carryover of losses and start-up expenses); see also Policies
and Regulations, supra note 8.
24. See Chapter XIV, supra note 10.
25. See id. sec. 2 (defining broadly loans, deposits, investments, and equity
contributions). Loans, for instance, include placement by Chilean companies of
convertible debt instruments on foreign capital markets. Id.
26. See id. sec. 1 (exempting inter-banking transactions, which are regulated
separately).
27. See id. sec. 3.
28. See id. sec. 4.
29. See Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10, art. 49
sec. 2.
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loaned, or deposited in Chile.30 This reserve provision, called encaje,
is currently dormant, and was used for the last time during the Asian
(including Russian) financial crisis of 1998.31 In the case of incoming
funds, encaje is applicable only to such funds that are transferred to
Chile after the effective day of the Central Bank's order and is not
applicable to foreign funds that have already been deposited, loaned,
or invested in Chile as of that date. 2 The Central Bank Law gives the
Central Bank the authority to suspend currency exchange operations
on the Formal Exchange Market, with the exception of those
operations necessary for performance of obligations under import-
export transactions.3 The Central Bank, however, may order the
deferral of currency exchange operation necessary for payment under
import-export deals for up to one hundred eighty days upon
application filed by a party of an import-export contract with a
Formal Exchange Market institution.3 4
II. ANALYSIS
Both of the currency control measures, the one-year restriction on
withdrawal of invested funds under DL 600 and encaje, are intended
to discourage so called capitales golondrina ("swallow capital").35
These are foreign funds coming to Chile with the sole purpose of
harvesting quick profits from speculative activity on Chilean
markets, presumably creating no assets of lasting value but
threatening to undermine the country's economy in case of rapid
30. See id.
31. See Trade Negotiations Bog Down on Reserve Requirements, BUS. NEWS
AM., Mar. 19, 2002 (discussing encaje and identifying it as a debated issue in the
Chile-U.S. free trade negotiations), available at 2002 WL 4437427; see also Going
it Alone - Chile's Trade Agreements, supra note 3 (commenting on Chile's trade
agreements).
32. See Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10, art. 49.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement: What is it About?, supra
note 2 (discussing the purpose of capitales golondrina).
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withdrawal. 36 While both of these mechanisms negatively affect the
volume of foreign investment, each has its own specific implications.
The advantage of investing under DL 600 is that a foreign
investment contract is a legally binding document that cannot be
unilaterally amended either by the state or by the foreign investor.37
This becomes important in long-term investment projects when a
foreign investor acquires substantial illiquid property, such as
industrial production facilities. Thus, although DL 600 may also be
applied to portfolio investment,38 its contractual structure better
serves strategic, or direct, investors.39 Its disadvantage is the
mandatory one-year restriction on withdrawal of invested capital,
apparently intended to protect Chile's robust but small economy
from large capital withdrawal within a short period of time.4° Such a
provision may deter some foreign investors and increase the "risk
premium" that the brave ones may seek to charge their Chilean
counterparts.
Chile's official opinion proffered by the Foreign Investment
Committee ("the Committee") is that the one-year restriction does
not affect investors' decisions to bring funds to Chile.42 The
Committee believes that because every direct investment project by
definition takes more than one year to develop and begin generating
profits, investors who commit to Chile are not deterred by such a
restriction.43 The Committee, however, does not provide any data on
36. See id. at 17 (discussing regulatory measures aimed to discourage inflow of
capitales golondrina).
37. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9 (establishing the decree).
38. See id. art. 2 (outlining the foreign investment statute).
39. See id. (establishing the provisions structure of the statute).
40. See Qu6 Estamos Negociando Con EEUU? [What are We Negotiating
With the United States?] (discussing measures that restrict withdrawal of foreign
funds as a mechanism to protect Chile's economy in times of turmoil in
international financial markets), available at
http://www.direcon.cl/html/tcl/negociando.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
41. See id. (explaining some effects of the one-year restriction provision).
42. See id. (commenting on the position of the Chilean government).
43. See Policies and Regulations, supra note 8, (explaining Chile's direct
investment program); see also Telephone Interview with Alex Foxley, Special
Advisor on Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Nov. 22, 2002) (addressing why
long-term investors are not discouraged by the restrictions)..
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how many potential investors each year decide not to invest in Chile
because of this restriction.14 Nor do they provide any estimation of a
total surcharge, allocable to the risk associated with the one-year
restriction, that Chilean companies have to pay to foreign investors
for their capital.45
The existing restriction may discourage some potential investors
who have never done business or invested in Chile but might
otherwise be interested in doing so, and it certainly does not enhance
the image of Chilean economic legislation. This restriction is also
inconsistent with the broader aims of Chile's recent FTAs. 46 The
country may well expect that foreigners would want to use Chile as a
platform for production and export of goods to major world markets,
such as the European Union and the United States, thereby taking
advantage of eliminated or reduced import tariffs. 47 However, the
continuing one-year restriction on capital withdrawal will not well
serve this expectation.
Foreign strategic investors may choose the Chapter XIV approach
and thus avoid the one-year restriction under DL 600.48 A possible
disadvantage of this approach, which might or might not prevail
depending on the particular circumstances of an investment project,
is the absence of governmental obligations to abide by certain agreed
rules with respect to a particular investor. 49 For instance, accelerated
44. See Policies and Regulations, supra note 8 (discussing what the Committee
provides).
45. See id. (noting the regulations of Chile's program).
46. See Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement: What is it About?, supra
note 2, at 31 (describing the free trade agreement with the United States).
47. See id. (articulating how the Free Trade Agreement with the United States
may make Chile attractive for businesses providing and exporting services related
to information technologies); see also El Presidente Afirma que el TLC Nos Obliga
a Ser M~is Transparentes, Flexibles y Eficientes [The President Affirms that the
FTA Obliges Us to Be More Transparent, Flexible, and Efficient], ESTRATEGIA,
Dec. 16, 2003 (discussing the interest of businessmen from other Latin American
countries in setting up production facilities in Chile in order to export their
products free of tariffs from Chile to Europe), available at
http://www.estrategia.cl/histo/200212/16/notas.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
48. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9, art. 1 lbis(2) (setting forth the one-
year time restriction).
49. See id. (noting the rules and governmental obligations of the law).
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depreciation of long-term capital assets can be provided for in the
DL 600 investment contract.5 0 Notwithstanding the choice of legal
framework, however, strategic and portfolio investors both are
potentially subject to encaje.5 '
One may regard encaje as an involuntary interest-free loan
extended to the Chilean government on its demand.12 Dormant, but
still a potential threat, encaje appears responsible for the minuscule
presence of foreign institutional investors in Chile's capital market. 3
Thus, encaje discourages U.S. mutual funds from investing in
Chile's capital market because measures such as repatriation
restrictions, which are designed to complicate foreign investors'
ability to withdraw their money from Chile, also have the effect of
making it difficult to comply with mutual fund pricing and liquidity
regulations under U.S. laws. 4
50. See id. (stating who is subject to encaje).
51. See Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10, art. 49
sec. 2 (providing that loans, deposits, and investments in foreign currency that
come into Chile or are to be transferred out of the country are subject to encaje).
52. See id. (giving the Central Bank discretionary power to order that
obligatory reserves be interest free or subject to interest rates not in excess of
"normal" market interest rates).
53. See Cifuentes et al., supra note 7, at 7 (providing statistical data on the
structure and development of the capital market in Chile, as gathered by Chile's
Central Bank). Notwithstanding the growth of Chile's economy, its otherwise
investment-friendly legal framework, and its lack of corruption, the commitment of
foreign investment funds to Chile steadily declined from 3.06 percent of Chile's
GDP in 1995 to 0.98 percent in 2000. Id.
54. See Letter from Mary S. Podesta, Senior Counsel, The Investment
Company Institute, to John B. Taylor, U.S. Under Secretary of Treasury for
International Affairs (Jan. 10, 2002) (expressing the support of the U.S. asset
management industry to eliminate Chilean restrictions on repatriation of capital by
foreign portfolio investors), available at
http://www.ici.org/chile-repatriatescom.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
Historically, U.S. mutual funds have invested in Chile only through ADRs because
of liquidity and pricing concerns. Id.; see also Trade Negotiations Bog Down on
Reserve Requirements, supra note 31 (discussing Chile's unwillingness to
eliminate the capital reserve requirement for U.S. investments in Chile). The
United States has won no concession from Chile in this area, unless one considers
as concessions Chile's pledge to impose encaje only in absolutely extreme
circumstances and for not more than one year. Id.; see also Santiago, supra note 1,
(discussing U.S. compromise on encaje); Chile and the United States Successfully
Concluded FTA Negotiations, supra note 1 (announcing that encaje as a protective
mechanism will not be eliminated, but will be limited to extreme circumstances);
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Chile's government seems convinced that encaje is a proven and
efficient mechanism for protecting the Chilean economy in times of
financial crisis in international markets.55 However, a more efficient
protection mechanism is a total ban on foreign portfolio investment.
Meanwhile, the brunt of protection against capitales golondrina is
borne by Chilean companies, and in particular, by medium size
companies that cannot raise cheaper capital to finance their
operations and expansion. 6  Chile's government has already
recognized that the high cost of raising funds on internal capital
markets is a problem to overcome, and has attacked the problem by
passing a group of measures under the current plan of market
reforms, Reforma del Mercado de Capitales I ("Capital Market
Reform I")." However, such measures fall short of removing
restrictions on transfers of foreign funds. Portfolio investment by
foreigners in minority ownership of well-run Chilean companies is
not an option if investors are prevented from promptly rebalancing
their portfolio as market conditions change.58 Given the fact that the
pool of potential foreign portfolio investors exceeds that of potential
strategic investors, it is reasonable to propose that Chile's economy
in general receives substantially less investment than it could if
capital restrictions were removed.
Withdrawal of capital en mass is typically caused by dramatically
unfavorable political or economic events happening inside the
Going it Alone - Chile's Trade Agreements, supra note 3 (discussing the trade
relationship between the United States and Chile); Chile-United States Free Trade
Agreement : What is it About ?, supra note 2, at 17.
55. See What are We Negotiating With the United States?, supra note 40
(outlining Chile's policy of negotiation of the FTA with the United States).
56. See Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement: What is it About?, supra
note 2, at 17 (describing regulatory measures aimed discouraging the inflow of
capitales golondrina).
57. See Cifuentes et al., supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the high cost of raising
capital on Chile's stock exchange for local small- and medium-sized companies);
see also Resumen de la Reforma del Mercado de Capitales [Summary of the
Reform of Capital Market] 4 (Apr. 19, 2001) (outlining a complex package of laws
liberalizing regulations of capital markets in Chile and that particularly provide for
elimination of a capital gain tax on revenue from sales of shares of medium-size
corporations listed on the Santiago stock exchange), available at
http://www.minhda.cl/castellano/inicio.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
58. See Summary of the Reform of Capital Market, supra note 57.
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country.59 Chile has survived, without enforcing encaje, through the
collapse of the Argentina's economy, the devaluation of currency in
Brazil, and the general slow-down in the world economy since the
middle of 2000.60 It is possible that Chile is overrating the risk of
capital flight and underestimating the cost that encaje and the DL
600 restriction on withdrawal of invested capital impose on its
economy by depriving companies of cheaper funding and
discouraging potential investors.6' In order to take full advantage of
the FTAs, Chilean exporting companies will need to lower their costs
of production.62 Currency restrictions tend to produce exactly the
opposite result, by limiting the volume of available capital and by
adding risk, thus increasing transaction costs. 63 The longer capital
restrictions are kept, the longer Chile's "big bang" is postponed. 64
Observers note that "Chile usually outperforms its neighbors on the
way down, but generally underperforms in a rebound. 65
III.RECOMMENDATIONS
The encaje and the DL 600 one-year restriction on withdrawal of
capital as protective measures against massive capital flight appear to
be unnecessary. This is especially true considering the basic
soundness and stability of Chile's economy and transparency of
Chile's political system, which have produced a long period of
59. See id. (discussing the political and economic conditions in Chile).
60. See Contreras, supra note 7 (noting Chile's prosperous economic
performance while the rest of South America suffers)
61. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9, art. I lbis(2) (stating who is subject
to encaje).
62. See Contreras, supra note 7 (describing Chile's plan to encourage
investment).
63. See id. (discussing different business plans in South America).
64. See Cifuentes et al., supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the aim of Chile's
government to develop a strategy of market deregulation bringing about a financial
"big bang" similar to those experienced by more developed financial markets in
the 1980s and resulting in rapid economic growth).
65. See Jonathan Karp, et al., Americas: A Year for Most Overseas Investors to
Forget, WALL STREET J., Jan. 2, 2003, at R14 (discussing poor performance of
Latin American stock markets in 2002).
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growth and a low foreign debt.66 They also conflict with Chile's
economic policy and goal of keeping pace with more developed
countries.67
DL 600's one-year restriction is a particularly unnecessary
measure. The better solution is to repeal this restriction altogether. A
more conservative approach would be movement of the restriction
from the list of investor's mandatory obligations to the list of
negotiable obligations. 68  Given the contractual structure of
investment projects under DL 600, the question of the minimum time
period for foreign investment should be a subject of negotiation.69
However, foreign investors should take into account Chile's
preference for retaining imported capital as long as possible as well
as the particular requirements of individual investment projects.70 It
may well be that in the case of long-term, large investments such as
mining projects, foreign investors may generally be indifferent to the
one-year capital withdrawal restriction.7' However, in the case of
smaller investments into projects with shorter operational cycles,
such as medium-sized food processing plants or information
technology development laboratories, an investor may well be more
concerned about the risks posed by any restriction on capital
withdrawal.72 Relaxing the restriction now, shortly before or after
FTAs become operational, would serve Chile's goal of greater
diversification in exports.73 Liberalization of capital restriction would
66. See Solid Macroeconomic Fundamentals (providing statistical data on
Chile's fiscal balance over the last decade), available at
http://www.inversionextranjera.cl//chilesadvantages/solid-macrofundamentals.asp
(last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
67. See Decree-Law No. 600, supra note 9, art. I lbis(2) (exemplifying the goal
of the Chilean government to keep pace with more developed countries).
68. See id. (outlining the mandatory obligations and negotiable obligations of
investors).
69. See id. (establishing the contractual requirements of DL 600).
70. See id. (exemplifying Chile's preference for retaining imported capital as
long as possible).
71. See Letter from Mary S. Podesta, supra note 54 (examining ways in which
foreign investment is discouraged in Chile).
72. See id.
73. See id. (commenting on the types of restrictions that discourage U.S.
investment).
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also reduce the reluctance of investors to enter less developed and
riskier export industries than the more traditional ones, such as
mining or agricultural industries.74
Similarly, encaje, as a supported protection against capital flight,
should be eliminated. If Chile is concerned about speculative activity
by certain foreign investors, it should differentiate among them and
treat each type of player separately.75 For instance, pension funds
differ from hedge funds in their activity, strategy, and accountability
rules. As a provisional measure, for instance, Chile could make
encaje inapplicable to strategic investors and some portfolio
investors, such as traditional U.S. mutual funds or pension funds, and
retain encaje for potential application to the activities of hedge
funds.76 Because every transaction of foreign currency over $10,000
must be conducted through the Formal Exchange Market and
reported to the Central Bank, investors may be required to disclose
the character of the fund, which will enable the Central Bank to
monitor who invests in the capital markets for what purposes, and
who may be subject to encaje if circumstances warrant.7
CONCLUSION
The slowdown of Chile's market reforms is recognized as a reason
why Chile's economy has not performed well since the mid-1990s in
terms of productivity, growth, and expected returns.78 Some skeptics
suggest that Chile's euphoria about the Chile-U.S. FTA is premature
and, absent a more serious approach to market reforms in Chile,
74. See Solid Macroeconomic Fundamentals, supra note 66 (reviewing
competitive markets and economies).
75. See id. (comparing Chilean trade programs with other countries).
76. See Letter from Mary S. Podesta, supra note 54 (discussing U.S. mutual
funds).
77. See Organic Constitutional Law on Central Bank, supra note 10
(mandating rules for transaction of foreign currency).
78. See Cifuentes et al., supra note 7, at 10 (admitting that in the mid-1990s,
Chile's government slowed its economic reforms, adversely affecting productivity
growth and expected returns). After 1995, Chile continued to grow at a relatively
high rate, however, due to benevolent external conditions and an increase in
productivity, but controls on capital flows, overregulation, and concentration in
several industries prevented the economy from growing at higher rate. Id.
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potential FTA benefits may be vastly exaggerated.79 For Chilean
products to be competitive on newly opened markets, Chilean
companies must reduce their costs of production.8" Cheaper labor
alone is unlikely to offset the relatively high shipment costs from
Chile to the European Union or United States, or the high cost of
capital necessary for Chilean export industries to finance their
expanding operations.8 While the Chilean government cannot
change the country's remote geographical position, it can help its
producers make their goods more competitive in foreign markets by
adopting market-oriented reforms that relax or eliminate controls on
the movement of foreign capital.8"
79. See Edwards, supra note 6 (discussing a necessity for Chile to implement
market-oriented policies aimed at making Chile's products more competitive
abroad).
80. See id. (contemplating how Chile can make the most of its U.S. trade deal).
81. See id. (commenting on what Chilean export industries need to finance
expansion).
82. See Letter from Mary S. Podesta, supra note 54 (suggesting that Chile relax
its restrictions on trade).
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